Our 2027 projections have a confidence ceiling of 78.4% state-level accuracy and a floor of 56.8%. 2027 resembles 2011→2015 more than 2019→2023 — consolidation of existing forces rather than new movement emerging. Confidence sits closer to ceiling than floor.
The 2019→2023 backtest showed that PDP's institutional base in Bauchi (426,607 votes), Kaduna (554,360), Katsina (489,045), and other northern states delivered votes beyond what trendlines predicted — even as Atiku's national numbers collapsed to a career low.
This confirmed what the political evidence already suggested: Atiku's 2023 PDP votes were the machine's votes, not his personal votes. When he left PDP those votes stayed with PDP.
The 2011→2015 backtest showed anti-incumbent sentiment worth approximately 15 percentage points against Jonathan — higher than standard models assume. Our current APC erosion factor of 9% is deliberately conservative.
If 2027 economic conditions resemble 2015 — sustained fuel price crisis, currency pressure, unemployment — the actual erosion could reach 14.000000000000002%.
In 2023 Mark Essien and Nigerian volunteers transcribed 170,000 polling unit result sheets into spreadsheets in 5 days. The data was used as evidence in Peter Obi's presidential tribunal petition.
We obtained all 37 state files from the public Google Drive and ran a systematic comparison against INEC's official collation results. Coverage: 100% Results_Found across all states, though 4 states (Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara) show data quality issues suggesting most sheets were unreadable.
What we found: 7,154,064 votes appear in INEC's official results that are not in the polling unit sheets — a 44.1% national inflation. In 33 of 37 states this inflation affected all parties roughly proportionally and winners were consistent. In Rivers State, the pattern was different.
We use this dataset as a verification layer — not a replacement for official results. Where the two datasets are consistent, they reinforce each other. Where they diverge, we show both and let readers judge. The tribunal dismissed Obi's petition. Our role is to show the data.
Peter Obi moved from LP to ADC. His 2023 votes were a mix of genuine personal preference and ethnic solidarity. The ethnic solidarity component (Southeast) transfers at high rates regardless of party vehicle. The genuine preference component (Middle Belt, FCT, Plateau) transfers at medium rates. The protest vote component (Lagos, Ogun) transfers at medium-low rates — those voters chose Obi specifically; whether they follow him to ADC depends on how strongly they engage.
| Zone | Rate | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Southeast | 88–90% | Ethnic solidarity follows the man |
| South-South | 65–68% | Preference + anti-APC, not pure ethnic |
| Middle Belt | 75–78% | Christian preference — follows Obi |
| Southwest | 70–72% | Urban protest vote — medium transfer |
| Northeast | 60–62% | Scattered LP votes — moderate follow |
| Northwest | 60–62% | Same |
Kwankwaso's votes are personal movement votes. NNPP was built around him specifically. When he moves, his voters move — particularly in Kano where 997,279 people voted for his movement personally, not for any party ideology. Outside Kano his reach is real but limited.
| Zone | Rate | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Kano | 88–90% | Personal movement — follows him |
| NW other | 55–58% | Some network, not as personal |
| All other | 26–30% | Scattered, limited personal pull |
This is the most misunderstood vote bloc in the 2027 analysis. Atiku's 6.98M votes in 2023 were primarily institutional PDP votes delivered by state machinery that did not follow him to ADC. The backtests confirm this. We apply the lowest transfer rates of any bloc — 6–8% in the Northwest and Northeast — with Adamawa as the sole exception where personal loyalty is genuine.
| Zone | Rate | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Adamawa | 40–60% | Home state — personal loyalty real |
| Northeast | 8% | Revised down — backtest confirmed PDP machine stays with PDP |
| Northwest | 6% | Same — Katsina, Jigawa stay PDP |
| Middle Belt | 5% | Minimal personal following |
| South | 3% | Near zero |
Atiku formally withdraws from presidential ambition. He campaigns actively for the ticket, particularly in the Northeast and his Adamawa network. His endorsement moves some former PDP voters to ADC.
LOW but possible.
Atiku is in ADC but not on the ticket and not actively campaigning. His presence is nominal. Former PDP voters in the North largely stay with whoever PDP runs or stay home.
Most consistent with Atiku's documented political behaviour and current signals.
ADC primary or negotiation produces Atiku as presidential candidate. Obi accepts VP or campaigns nominally. The Obidient movement does not transfer enthusiasm to an Atiku-led ticket.
Would require Obi to accept subordination to a candidate his own movement rejected in 2023 when given the explicit choice.
ADC negotiations collapse. One or more principals leave. Multiple opposition candidates split the anti-APC vote again. Tinubu wins with 35–38% in a three or four-way race.
The incentive structure that produced 2023's split still exists. Nigerian political history offers more examples of failed opposition unity than successful ones.
APC controls 30 of 36 state governments. But not all APC governors are equal. Some won their seats on APC and have full, loyal machinery. Others won on PDP, LP, or NNPP and personally defected — their administrative machinery switched, their grassroots did not. We apply different discounts to each.
We are not making allegations about specific individuals or institutions. We are applying historical base rates from documented patterns in Nigerian result management to forward-looking analysis. Every discount is published here.
Opposition margin >20% in 2023. Even accounting for machinery discount and transfer rate uncertainty, the outcome is unlikely to change.
Margin 10–20%. Outcome is directionally clear but sensitive to transfer rate assumptions. Could shift one category under different scenario selections.
Margin 5–10%. Machinery discount and transfer rate uncertainty both matter here. One or two percentage points in either assumption changes the call.
Margin under 5%. Ground game, turnout, and result management decide this state. Our model cannot call it. Watch these states most closely.
Whether ADC resolves its ticket before the registration deadline
What PDP does — their candidate choice changes the northern math more than any other variable
What the economy looks like in early 2027 — our APC erosion range is 8–14.000000000000002% depending on this
Whether Obi's ADC energy matches his 2023 LP energy — the vehicle changed
Whether INEC's administration improves from 2023 — our model applies historical base rates for result management
Whether a new political force emerges the way Obi did in 2023 — if it does, our accuracy drops toward 56.8%